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i 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the link between international financial integration and 
economic growth. In particular, we ask the following questions. What are the 
theoretical links between financial integration and growth? Is there any empirical 
evidence that an increase in financial integration is associated with higher 
economic growth at a cross-country level? Do different types of capital flows have 
different implications for growth? 
Existing empirical evidence suggests that the link between financial openness and 
economic growth is weak at best. While there is some evidence that financial 
liberalisation positively affects growth, this relationship is not robust. There is also 
some evidence that the positive impact of foreign investment on growth is 
conditional upon the existence of relatively developed domestic institutions and 
sound macroeconomic policy. This result is also not very robust and is sensitive to 
the measures employed to capture institutional development and the policy 
environment. 
To complement the existing research, we examine this issue with a particular 
emphasis on the composition of capital flows. Consistent with conventional 
wisdom, we find that both foreign direct investment and portfolio inflows enhance 
economic growth. By contrast, the effect of bank inflows is found to be mostly 
negative. 
JEL Classification Numbers: F21, F36, F43 
Keywords: capital flows, financial liberalisation, growth  
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INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
1. Introduction 
So now we have all the benefits of free flows of international capital. These 
benefits are mammoth: the ability to borrow abroad kept the Reagan deficits from 
crushing US growth like an egg, and the ability to borrow from abroad has 
enabled successful emerging market economies to double or triple the speed at 
which their productivity and living standards converge to the industrial core. But 
the free flow of financial capital is also giving us one major international financial 
crisis every two years.1 
These assertions assume that free capital mobility is enormously beneficial while 
simultaneously failing to evaluate its crisis-prone downside. But even a cursory 
glance at history suggests that these gains may be negligible.2 
Experience suggests that international financial liberalisation can be a mixed 
blessing. International borrowing helps individual countries smooth consumption 
and finance productive investment. Foreign investment, particularly foreign direct 
investment, can facilitate the transfer of technological and managerial know-how. 
Portfolio investment and foreign bank lending can also contribute to the deepening 
of the domestic financial market. Some proponents have argued that, by   
increasing the rewards for good policies and the penalties for bad policies, capital  
flows can promote more disciplined macroeconomic policies (Grilli and   
Milesi-Ferretti 1995). 
At the same time, financial liberalisation entails several risks. Capital inflows can 
lead to an appreciation of the domestic currency and adversely affect the trade 
balance. Large and sudden inflows can fuel rapid consumption growth, rising or 
sustained high inflation, and unsustainable current account deficits. Financial 
liberalisation in countries with underdeveloped financial systems can make them 
                                           
1   DeLong (1998). 
2   Bhagwati (1998).  
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more crisis-prone. For instance, a rapid expansion in bank lending, fuelled by 
capital inflows, can result in a deterioration of bank balance sheets, which in turn 
can increase these countries’ vulnerability to financial crises (Calvo, Leiderman 
and Reinhart 1993). 
While the debate on the merits of capital account liberalisation is not new, it has 
intensified in the aftermath of the emerging market crises of the 1990s. The 
Mexican crisis, and the Asian crisis in particular, showed that even countries with 
high growth rates and sound macroeconomic policies could be severely affected by 
a rapid reversal of capital flows. These events have prompted proposals that range 
from ‘throwing sand in the wheels’ of capital movements to the complete 
prohibition of international financial transactions. Sceptics of measures aimed at 
limiting capital mobility, on the other hand, argue that these would result in lost 
investment and economic growth. 
The key to this debate is whether the potential benefits of financial integration are 
sufficient to offset the evident risks. While there is a large body of work that looks 
at the risks associated with financial liberalisation and capital flows,3 there has 
been, until recently, only a few studies that evaluate the benefits of open capital 
markets. The aim of this paper is to shed some light on this debate by examining 
both the theoretical links and the empirical evidence on effects of financial 
liberalisation on long-run economic growth. We also present some new results on 
the effects of capital flows, with a particular emphasis on the composition of 
capital flows. 
Existing empirical evidence suggests that the link between financial openness and 
economic growth is weak. While there is some evidence that liberalisation 
positively affects growth, this relationship is not robust. There is some evidence 
that the positive impact of foreign investment on growth is conditional upon the 
existence of relatively developed domestic institutions and sound macroeconomic 
policy. This result is also not very robust and is sensitive to the measures employed 
to capture institutional development and policy variables. The new results from 
this study show that both foreign direct investment and portfolio flows have a 
significant positive effect on economic growth. The positive effects of portfolio 
                                           
3  Some examples include Calvo et al (1993), Chinn and Dooley (1995), and Corsetti, Pesenti 
and Roubini (1998).  
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flows are above and beyond their effects on investment, indicating that they also 
entail externalities that are growth enhancing. The effect of bank flows, on the 
other hand, is found to be negative. This suggests that the measures of capital 
account liberalisation used by previous studies may not adequately measure the 
true extent of a country’s financial integration. It also suggests that aggregate 
measures of capital flows and openness could conceal the different channels 
through which different types of capital flow might affect growth. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 looks at some recent 
trends in capital flows to developing countries during the past few decades.   
Section 3 briefly reviews the theoretical literature on the macroeconomic effects of 
capital flows. In Sections 4 and 5 we present the relevant empirical evidence. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Capital Flows to Developing Countries: Trends During the 
Past Three Decades 
The developing country experience with capital flows has been characterised by 
cycles of booms and busts. After more than two decades of limited capital flows, 
capital flows to developing countries surged in the 1970s. With the onset of the 
debt crisis in 1982, capital inflows to developing countries declined dramatically 
and remained small during most of the 1980s. This trend was reversed in the   
late 1980s, and capital flows to Asia and Latin America increased substantially in 
the first half of the 1990s. The setback from the 1994 Mexican crisis was relatively 
short-lived, with capital flows to emerging markets, including Mexico, resuming 
soon after the crisis. Capital flows, especially to Asia, slowed down considerably 
in the wake of the Asian crisis in 1997. Capital flows to developing countries 
remained subdued in the second half of the 1990s, reflecting the effects of the 
Asian crisis as well as the Russian and Brazilian crises of 1998 and 1999. 
Capital flows to developing countries in the 1970s were associated with the 
recycling of oil revenues – the so-called petrodollars – by oil producing countries. 
As the petrodollars were intermediated through international commercial banks, 
capital flows to developing countries were primarily in the form of syndicated 
bank loans. Capital inflows to developing countries during 1978–1981 averaged 
US$68 billion, and were comprised mainly of bank loans (Table 1).  
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Table 1: Capital Inflows to Developing Countries by Types and Use 
1978–1995
(a) 
 1978–1995  1978–1981  1982–1989  1990–1995 
By type of inflow (billions of US$)      
Total 71  68  24  135 
FDI 26  9  13  54 
Portfolio investment  19  2  2  52 
Loans 26  57  9  29 
By use of inflow (Per cent of total inflows)       
Current account financing  53  67  88  40 
Capital outflows  34  17  65  32 
Reserves and related items  2  6  –75  19 
Reserve assets  34  13  46  38 
IMF credits
(b) –2  –3  –5  –1 
Exceptional financing
(c) –30  –5  –116  –18 
Errors and omissions
(d) 11  11  21  9 
Notes:  (a) These figures cover 58 developing countries and are averages for the period. Percentages may not sum
to 100 because of rounding. 
  (b) Use of Fund credit loans and loans. A negative value indicates net borrowing. 
  (c) Transactions undertaken by a country’s authorities to finance balance of payments shortfalls. 
  (d) The statistical discrepancy between outflows and inflows as reported by the countries. 
Source:  Bosworth and Collins (1999) 
 
This trend came to an abrupt halt in 1982 when Mexico declared a moratorium on 
its debt-service payments in August of that year. This, combined with the debt 
service difficulties of other Latin American countries including Argentina and 
Brazil, led to a rapid decline in capital flows to the region. The decline in total 
capital flows to developing countries was fully accounted for by the decline in 
capital flows to Latin America, which as a whole experienced a net outflow during 
1983–1989. In contrast, capital flows to Asia and developing countries in other 
regions increased modestly during this period. 
A combination of domestic and external factors contributed to the resurgence of 
capital flows to developing countries in the late 1980s. The main domestic factors 
were the initiation of the Brady plan for debt restructuring in 1989, and the 
successful implementation of other structural reform programs in many   
Latin American countries. The decline in US interest rates and the growth of 
institutional investors worldwide in the early 1990s were the primary external  
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factors. In addition to the surge in magnitude, there were also important changes in 
composition of capital flows. While bank flows were dominant during the 1970s, 
capital flows in this episode consisted mainly of foreign direct investment and 
portfolio flows. Capital flows to Asia were primarily in the form of FDI, whereas 
portfolio flows were more important in Latin America, accounting for over   
60 per cent of total inflows. Further, much of the foreign borrowing during the 
1970s was done by the public sector, while capital flows in the early 1990s were 
primarily directed at the private sector. 
This new wave of capital flows was perceived as a positive global development. It 
provided increased diversification opportunities to investors in developed 
countries. Capital inflows also held the potential of augmenting domestic 
investment, and hence economic growth in emerging economies that had until then 
experienced years of tight external financing constraints. For Latin America, in 
particular, the renewed access to international capital markets seemed to   
signal an end to the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s. At the same time, given the 
experience of the early 1980s, many voiced concerns about the potential risks   
of capital flows, especially short-term capital flows. Of particular concern was that, 
as in the previous episode, capital flows could reverse abruptly and lead to 
balance-of-payments crises. The Mexican peso crisis of 1994 validated some of 
these concerns. 
Mexico’s adoption of a strong adjustment program, aided by the large-scale 
international financial support, helped restore financial stability in the country 
relatively quickly.4 Indeed, Mexico returned to international capital markets more 
rapidly than most observers had anticipated. Other countries affected by the crisis 
included Argentina and Brazil, and to a lesser extent, Thailand and Hong Kong. 
The contagion from the Mexican crisis was short-lived and capital flows to 
developing countries reached a record level of US$212 billion in 1996. 
In contrast, the impact of the Asian crisis that followed Thailand’s devaluation of 
the baht in 1997 was more widespread and longer lasting. While FDI and portfolio 
flows to the five Asian countries most affected by the crisis recovered fairly 
quickly, these countries continued to experience net outflows as international 
                                           
4   The IMF arrangement with Mexico was the largest ever approved for a member country, both 
in absolute amount and in relation to the country’s quota in the Fund.  
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banks reduced their exposure to the region. The Asian crisis, combined with the 
Russian and the Brazilian crises in 1998 and 1999, led to a significant decline in 
capital flows to most developing countries. Overall, net private inflows to 
emerging markets in 1999 were equivalent to approximately 1.1 per cent of 
aggregate emerging market GDP, down from 3 per cent in 1995. 
3.  How Does Financial Liberalisation Affect Economic Growth? 
A Review of the Theoretical Literature  
Theory suggests different channels through which increased capital mobility can 
enhance economic growth. Capital flows can enhance economic growth by 
augmenting the domestic investment rate. In open-economy versions of 
neoclassical growth models, capital flows from capital-rich to capital-poor 
countries where the marginal product of capital is higher. This results in an 
increase in the rate of capital accumulation and growth in the latter. This channel 
emphasises the role of net capital flows. In these models, for capital flows to have 
a positive influence on growth, they must augment domestically financed 
investment, rather than crowd it out. 
Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin (1995) present an open-economy version of a 
simple neoclassical growth model. In this model domestic residents own the 
physical capital stock but may obtain part or all of the financing for this stock by 
issuing bonds to foreigners. By relaxing the constraint that domestic savings 
finance domestic investment, the availability of foreign savings increases the rate 
of physical capital accumulation. This in turn increases the country’s speed of 
convergence to its steady state level of output.5 
Gains from capital account liberalisation could also come from better utilisation of 
available domestic savings rather than from net inflows of foreign savings. This 
channel highlights the role of gross capital flows. These benefits are typically 
associated with foreign direct investment, but could also arise with other types of 
capital flows. For example, foreign investment could increase competition in the 
host economy, thereby making domestic firms more efficient. It could also lead to 
                                           
5   The results would be the same if foreigners were allowed to own part of the physical capital 
through foreign direct investment or equity investment rather than bonds.  
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transfers of technology and/or skills. Wang (1990) develops a model in which 
technology is assumed to be transferred via international capital movements from 
the developed North to the developing South. The rate of technological change is 
an increasing function of the amount of foreign capital operating in the South and 
of the extent to which technology in the advanced country exceeds that in the less 
developed country. It is shown that when the South shifts from autarky to free 
capital mobility, its steady state growth rate of per capita income also increases.6 
Another channel through which financial liberalisation could positively influence 
economic growth is through the benefits of portfolio diversification. Increased 
opportunity to diversify risk can enhance growth by inducing a shift toward 
investment in projects with higher expected returns. In turn, higher rates of return 
can deliver faster economic growth by encouraging higher savings and investment. 
Obstfeld (1994) presents a simple model of global portfolio diversification that 
links growth and financial openness. The set up is a stylised rendition of the idea, 
developed by Romer (1990) and by Grossman and Helpman (1991), that ongoing 
growth depends on investments that supply specialised and hence inherently risky 
production inputs. Because risky technologies in the model have higher expected 
returns than safe ones, international asset trade, which allows each country to hold 
a globally diversified portfolio of risky investments, encourages all countries to 
shift from low-return safe investments toward high-return risky investments. 
Provided risky returns are imperfectly correlated across countries, and provided 
some risk-free assets are initially held, a small rise in diversification opportunities 
always raises expected growth as well as national welfare. The key here is that 
financial liberalisation can enhance growth even in the absence of net capital 
inflow. 
The theoretical case for free capital mobility is based on the assumption that capital 
markets are efficient, and does not take into consideration the presence of 
distortions such as information asymmetry, moral hazard and herding on the part of 
foreign investors. Experience of both developed and developing countries suggests 
that when these distortions are present, capital flows can be destabilising. Indeed, a 
number of studies have identified these distortions as the key factor behind   
the boom and bust cycles of capital flows in emerging markets. Guttentag and 
Herring (1985), for example, argue that international commercial banks lent to  
                                           
6   For a more recent contribution see Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee (1998).  
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Latin America in the late 1970s and early 1980s with insufficient attention to 
borrower credibility due to incomplete information and official support in the event 
of adverse outcomes. Likewise, Dooley (1994) claims that the resurgence of capital 
flows to emerging markets in the early 1990s did not necessarily reflect renewed 
confidence in the investment climates in these countries, but rather, were motivated 
by moral hazard associated with fixed exchange rate regimes and lender of last 
resort facilities. 
The destabilising effect of capital flows in the presence of these distortions has 
been further highlighted by the Asian crisis. This has motivated a growing body of 
work that highlights the role of moral hazard and explicit or implicit government 
guarantees in increasing countries’ vulnerability to financial crises.7 In a typical 
framework, firms borrow from non-residents in foreign currency and lend 
domestically in local currency. Their investment decisions incorporate the 
expectation that relatively stable exchange rates will be maintained and, as 
governments are unable to credibly commit not to do so, that the government will 
bail them out in the event of a run. As lenders share this expectation, they have 
little incentive to monitor the quality of bank lending. This results in a level of 
investment that is higher than the optimal level obtained in the absence of credible 
implicit or explicit guarantees. However, foreign creditors stop lending when the 
government’s contingent liabilities exceed foreign reserves. The resulting 
devaluation in turn causes widespread bankruptcies of institutions with unhedged 
foreign currency exposures. Capital flows in this framework would not enhance 
growth, and can in fact impede growth by making countries more vulnerable to 
financial crises. 
In this section we examined the different channels through which capital flows can 
promote economic growth. We also discussed some of the risks associated with 
financial openness. Whether the growth-enhancing attributes of capital flows 
outweigh the potential risks is an empirical question, which we address in the next 
section. 
                                           
7   See for example, McKinnon and Pill (1998).  
 
9
4.  The Link between Capital Account Liberalisation and 
Economic Growth: A Brief Review of the Empirical 
Literature 
Instead of providing a comprehensive review of the empirical literature, in this 
section we address some measurement issues and present the main findings of 
some recent studies. 
4.1  Measuring Financial Integration  
Measuring the extent of a country’s international financial integration is not 
straightforward. The most commonly used measure is derived from information in 
the International Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions. It is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a country 
has capital account restrictions in a given year and 0 otherwise. This measure has 
the advantage of wide coverage, as it is available for all IMF member countries on 
an annual basis starting from 1966. However, it is an imperfect proxy for financial 
openness as it does not distinguish between different types of capital controls. 
Moreover, this binary variable indicating the presence (or absence) of capital 
controls does not capture the intensity of capital controls. 
The measure of financial openness developed by Quinn (1997) addresses some of 
these shortcomings. In addition to using restrictions on both residents and   
non-residents, this measure also distinguishes between different types of 
restrictions. By assigning numerical scores to various types of restrictions on 
governing capital account transactions, Quinn is able to provide some information 
about the intensity of capital controls for each country. While this measure is an 
improvement over the previous one, it is limited to 65 countries (21 developed and 
44 emerging economies) for three years (1959, 1973 and 1988). 
Both these measures based on capital account restrictions assume that the 
restrictions are fully effective, and therefore represent the countries’ true degree of 
financial openness. However, studies have found that capital controls, especially in 
developing countries, have been of limited effectiveness. In particular, there is 
some evidence to suggest that restrictions on capital account transactions become 
less binding over time as investors find ways of circumventing them  (see, for  
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example, Dooley (1996)). To the extent that this is plausible, these measures would 
underestimate the degree of a country’s financial openness. 
Using capital flow data is one way of getting around this problem. One could 
interpret capital flow figures as measuring countries’ effective financial openness. 
This is analogous to using trade volumes as a measure of trade openness. Another 
advantage of using capital flow figures is that they enable us to distinguish 
between different types of capital flows such as foreign direct investment, portfolio 
flows, bank loans etc. This level of disaggregation in turn allows us to more 
closely identify the different channels through which capital flows might affect 
economic growth. While there have been some improvements recently, capital 
flows data for some developing countries are incomplete and of poor quality. 
Given that all three measures come with caveats, it is important that we view them 
as complements to one another rather than substitutes. 
4.2  Recent Empirical Work and Key Findings 
A common approach to estimating the link between capital mobility and growth 
involves simple growth accounting regressions in the spirit of Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil (1992). Most studies include a set of control variables, and one or more of the 
financial openness variables described above. The data are typically averaged over 
five, ten or twenty years so that the data set is converted into either a cross-
sectional data set or a panel data set. 
Following the theoretical literature discussed at the end of Section 3, a number of 
recent studies also attempt to capture the extent to which distortions in the 
domestic economy influence the way financial liberalisation affects growth. As 
these distortions – information asymmetry and moral hazard – are difficult to 
quantify, these studies typically use different measures of institutional 
development and policy environment, with the idea being that these distortions are 
less in countries with strong institutions and sound policy environment. Commonly 
used variables include different measures of financial market development and the 
quality of other domestic institutions such as legal institutions, accounting 
standards etc. The inflation rate and the fiscal account are typically used to proxy 
the domestic policy environment.  
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In a widely cited study, Rodrik (1998) concludes that capital account convertibility 
is essentially uncorrelated with long-run economic performance. Using data for a 
sample of 100 developed and developing countries, and controlling for other 
determinants of growth, Rodrik regresses growth in per capita GDP on capital 
account openness. Openness for each country is defined as the number of years 
during the sample period when the country’s capital account was free from any 
restrictions (as measured by the binary indicator). Rodrik finds no association 
between capital account liberalisation and growth. He also tests the hypothesis that 
capital account convertibility might have had beneficial effects in countries with 
strong institutions. Rodrik finds no evidence for this in the data – interacting 
capital account liberalisation with indices of the quality of public institutions yields 
insignificant and often wrongly signed coefficients. 
These results are broadly consistent with those of Kraay (1998), who undertakes a 
more comprehensive examination of the effect of capital account liberalisation on 
investment, growth and inflation. The study includes data from 117 countries over 
the period 1985–1997, and uses all three measures of financial openness described 
in Section 4.1, and different measures of financial market development and policy 
environment.8 The link between capital account liberalisation and growth is found 
to be weak, and only those regressions that use capital flow data yield positive and 
statistically significant results. The evidence for the hypothesis that capital account 
liberalisation is successful in countries with a strong financial sector and a good 
policy environment is also found to be weak. 
The results from Klien and Olivei (1999) are somewhat kinder to the hypothesis 
that financial liberalisation is good for growth. They find that countries that had 
relatively open capital markets during 1976–1995 (defined as the number of years 
when the capital account was free of any restrictions) experienced relatively higher 
rates of economic growth. This result however is largely driven by the developed 
countries in the sample. Using the Quinn (1997) measure of financial openness, 
                                           
8  Kraay (1998) uses four different measures of financial sector strength: M2/GDP, domestic 
credit to the private sector as share of GDP, number of banking crises per year, and an index 
of the restrictiveness of bank regulations. To capture the broader policy environment, Kraay 
constructs an index as the weighted average of fiscal deficits and inflation following Burnside 
and Dollar (1997). The indices of the extent of corruption and quality of bureaucracy 
developed by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) are used to measure institutional 
development. The black market premium is used to measure the extent of domestic distortion.  
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Edwards (2001) comes to a similar conclusion. While liberalisation is found to 
boost economic growth, the effect is limited to the relatively developed countries 
in the sample. The interaction term between liberalisation and per capita GDP 
enters positively, indicating that the effect of a more open capital account increases 
with the country’s initial level of development. Furthermore, the coefficient on the 
openness index is negative, suggesting that an open capital account may in fact 
have a negative effect at low levels of development. 
The studies reviewed here suggest that the link between financial liberalisation and 
growth is weak at best. While these studies vary considerably in their   
country coverage, sample period, and estimation techniques, with the exception of  
Kraay (1998), they all use information on capital account restrictions to measure 
financial liberalisation. These studies therefore tell us about the implications of 
policy and changes in policy toward the capital account, not of the implications of 
capital flows themselves. For reasons already discussed, these measures of 
financial openness may not necessarily reflect the true extent of a country’s 
financial integration. These measures also do not tell us whether different types of 
capital flows affect growth differently. While some work has been done on the 
effects of foreign direct investment on growth, very little is known about the 
effects of bank and portfolio flows that have become increasingly important 
sources of external financing for many developing countries. In the next section, 
we examine the implications of the composition of capital flows for economic 
growth. 
5.  Capital Flows and Growth: Some New Results 
5.1 Data  and  Methodology 
Our empirical analysis employs annual data for a set of 40 countries, consisting of 
20 developed and 20 emerging and developing countries in Asia, Latin America 
and Africa.9 The sample period spans 1976–1995. The choice of countries and the 
sample period are dictated by data availability. The estimations use a panel 
regression framework, in which data for each country are averaged over five   
non-overlapping years. Averaging the data for a number of years helps abstract 
                                           
9   Details are provided in Appendix A.  
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from short-term business cycle effects and capture the longer-run effects of capital 
mobility on growth. 
The base specification of our model is as follows: 
  12 3 it i io it it it growth state control capflow α ββ β ε =+ + + +   (1) 
The dependent variable growth is the annual growth rate in real GDP per capita for 
country i averaged over each 5-year interval t. The first set of explanatory variables 
includes our state variables – the stock of human capital (proxied by the average 
years of secondary education in the adult population) and the level of real per 
capita GDP – both measured at the beginning of each 5-year interval. In the 
neoclassical framework, the coefficient on the initial per capita GDP captures the 
rate of convergence (i.e., the rate at which poor countries catch up with rich 
countries) and is expected to be negative.10 
The second set of explanatory variables includes a number of control variables that 
have been found to be important determinants of growth by previous studies. The 
coefficient on the openness to trade variable (proxied by ratio of the sum of total 
exports and imports to GDP) is expected to be positive. Government consumption 
is expected to have a negative effect on growth. Similarly the black-market 
exchange rate premium, which we use to proxy financial market distortions, is also 
expected to negatively affect growth. 
The third set of variables includes the different capital flow measures we use. The 
broadest measure we use is total capital inflows. We also consider the three main 
components of capital inflows – foreign direct investment, portfolio inflows and 
bank inflows. The different measures are entered sequentially into the regressions. 
An important consideration in these regressions is the possible endogeneity of 
financial liberalisation and capital flows. As noted by Kraay (1998) there are two 
main sources of endogeneity. The first is that capital flows themselves may be 
influenced by economic performance. If a country relaxes controls in ‘good’ times 
                                           
10   This property derives from the assumption of diminishing returns to capital – economies that 
have less capital per worker (relative to their long-run ratio) tend to have higher rates of return 
and higher growth rates.  
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and imposes them in ‘bad’ times, we would find a spuriously large positive effect 
of liberalisation on growth. Another source of endogeneity is that the extent of 
capital mobility may be correlated with other fundamental determinants of growth 
and investment. For example, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) observe that 
countries with small public sectors and relatively independent central banks are 
less likely to impose capital controls. If having a small public sector and an 
independent central bank were good for growth, then the benefits of capital 
account liberalisation would be overstated. In principle, this problem can be 
addressed by using instrumental variables that are correlated with financial 
openness, but uncorrelated with the disturbance term. Finding good instruments, 
however, is difficult. 
In selecting the instruments for our estimations we draw on the literature on the 
determinants of capital flows. Following the work of Calvo et al (1993) a number 
of studies have sought to explain the movements in capital flows by looking at the 
relative importance of the external (‘push’) factors and internal (‘pull’) factors. 
Their findings suggest that US interest rates have played a dominant role in driving 
capital flows to developing countries. We also use total flows to developing 
countries to reflect broader supply-side factors. Other instruments include lagged 
capital flows, lagged GDP growth, and change in the terms of trade. 
5.2  Main Results and Discussion  
Table 2 presents the main results from our regressions. Regression 2.1 is the base 
regression without the capital flow variables. The results are consistent with theory 
and previous empirical findings. The coefficient on initial GDP per capita is 
negative and statistically significant suggesting strong convergence. Education has 
a positive effect on growth, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
Openness to foreign trade has a positive and significant effect on growth. The 
coefficients on black market premium and government spending are both negative 
and significant. 
Regressions 2.2–2.5 augment the base regression with the different measures of 
capital flows. Total flows have a positive effect on growth, with the coefficient 
significant at the 10 per cent level. Regressions 2.3–2.5 look at FDI, portfolio, and 
bank flows individually. Foreign direct investment and portfolio flows have a  
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statistically significant positive effect on growth. Bank flows have a negative but 
statistically insignificant effect. 
Table 2: Effect of Capital Flows on Economic Growth in Developed and 
Developing Countries 
Dependent variable: growth rate of real per capita GDP 
  2.1 2.2  2.3  2.4  2.5 
    Total flows  FDI  Portfolio  Bank loans 
Initial GDP  –0.056***  –0.057***  –0.046*** –0.063***  –0.063*** 
  (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011)  (0.019) 
Human  capital  0.027 0.038*  0.014 0.036**  0.077** 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.013) (0.018)  (0.034) 
Government spending  –0.259***  –0.223***  –0.146**  –0.280***  –0.265*** 
  (0.075) (0.069)*** (0.070) (0.072)  (0.015) 
International trade  0.041***  0.033***  0.035*** 0.047***  0.037** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.017) 
Black market premium  –0.034***  –0.031**  –0.026*** –0.037***  –0.006 
  (0.011) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.017) 
Capital flows    0.086*  0.406**  0.239***  –0.271 
   (0.050)  (0.176)  (0.067)  (0.319) 
Adjusted R
2  0.53 0.63 0.59 0.59  0.56 
No of observations  155  126  146  145  131 
Notes:  Two-stage least squares panel regressions for 1976–1995 using 5-year averages. Numbers in parenthesis 
are White heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Instruments include US interest rate, total capital 
flows to all countries in sample, current and lagged terms of trade, lagged capital flows and lagged GDP.
Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% denoted by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 
Given our focus on the effect of capital flows on developing countries, we next 
consider the results for the developing countries in our sample (Table 3). The 
results for the base regression do not differ markedly from those of the full sample. 
Capital flows, however, are found to have a negative effect on growth, though the 
coefficient is not statistically significant. As in the full sample case, foreign direct 
investment and portfolio flows both have a statistically significant positive effect 
on growth. Bank flows are found to have a statistically significant negative effect 
on growth. These results are also economically significant. For example, an 
increase in FDI of 1 percentage point would result in a 0.40 percentage point 
higher real per capita growth rate per year. A 1 percentage point increase in 
portfolio flows is associated with a 0.35 percentage point increase, whereas a    
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1 percentage point increase in bank inflows results in a 0.33 percentage point 
decline in the real per capita GDP growth rate. 
Table 3: Effect of Capital Flows on Economic Growth in  
Developing Countries 
Dependent variable: growth rate of real per capita GDP 
  3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4  3.5 
    Total flows  FDI  Portfolio  Bank loans
Initial  GDP  –0.044***  –0.031** –0.036*** –0.052*** –0.039** 
  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.014) (0.013) (0.026) 
Human capital  0.021  0.026  0.020*  0.029  0.063** 
  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.017) (0.021) (0.033) 
Government spending  –0.268**  –0.095**  –0.187*  –0.276  –0.122 
  (0.136)  (0.109)  (0.124) (0.130) (0.123) 
International  trade  0.041**  0.035**  0.034** 0.047** 0.025 
  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) 
Black market premium  –0.033***  –0.031**  –0.031***  –0.036***  –0.030** 
  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) 
Capital flows    –0.045  0.412*  0.348**  –0.329* 
    (0.104)   (0.254)   (0.194)   (0.176) 
Adjusted R
2  0.55  0.66  0.63 0.61 0.60 
No of observations  75  58  67  67  58 
Notes:  As for Table 2. 
 
Note that we do not include the investment rate in these regressions, even though 
investment is an important determinant of economic growth. This has implications 
for the interpretation of the effect of capital flows on growth. The coefficient on 
the capital flow variables without investment captures the effect of capital flows on 
growth through all possible channels, including through investment. The 
coefficient on capital flow variables with investment on the other hand, captures 
the effect of capital flows on growth above and beyond its effect on total 
investment. When investment is included in the regression, the effect of FDI on 
growth is positive but no longer statistically significant at conventional levels. 
While the coefficient on portfolio flows becomes marginally smaller, it is 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. This suggests that portfolio flows 
affect economic growth above and beyond their effect on domestic investment.  
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The coefficient on bank flows remains negative and statistically significant at the  
5 per cent level. 
In order to check the robustness of these results, we introduce a variety of changes 
to our specification. These include replacing the black market premium with the 
measure of the size of the banking sector (bank assets/GDP), adding a measure of 
institutional strength (proxied by an index of law and contract enforcement), using 
a currency crisis dummy, and dummies for the 1980s to represent the period of the 
debt crisis and the ‘lost decade’ for the Latin American countries. Our findings for 
FDI and portfolio flows remain fairly robust to these changes. While the 
coefficients on bank flows remain negative, they are not always statistically 
significant. 
Our findings are consistent with the conventional wisdom on the composition of 
capital flows. Foreign direct investment has historically played a larger role in 
developing countries than have other forms of capital flows. Though some 
countries have experienced periods of large bank inflows, they haven’t been 
sustained over time. For the countries in our sample, FDI constituted the largest 
component of capital flows followed by portfolio flows and bank flows. During 
1976–1998 average annual foreign direct investment represented 1.4 per cent of 
GDP, and portfolio flows and bank flows were approximately 1.1 and 0.5 per cent 
of GDP. Similarly, simple measures of volatility indicate that FDI was the most 
stable form of capital flows, while bank flows were the most volatile. For instance, 
the coefficient of variation of annual FDI, portfolio and banks flows to our sample 
countries during 1976–1998 was 1.2, 2.8 and 4.8 per cent respectively. Given that 
bank flows have been small and volatile, it is likely that they have not made a 
meaningful contribution to investment. Our results also suggest that portfolio flows 
affect growth above and beyond their effect on investment. While the identification 
of the exact channels is beyond the scope of this paper, the most likely channel 
(besides investment) through which foreign investment in the domestic equity and 
debt markets could contribute to growth is through the development and deepening 
of these markets. 
The hypothesis that the quality of domestic financial and regulatory institutions 
determines the effect of liberalisation on growth is not firmly supported by the 
data. Our attempts to test this hypothesis by using alternative measures of 
institutional strength generally produce results that are either statistically  
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insignificant or contradict the hypothesis. The measures we considered included 
the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, the index of law and contract enforcement, 
and the index of the quality of countries’ accounting and reporting standards. Our 
guess is that this is a consequence of the incomplete and imprecise nature of these 
measures, and not because institutions do not play a role in this process. 
6. Concluding  Remarks 
The effect of international financial integration on economic growth has been the 
subject of ongoing debate in both academic and policy circles. Sceptics point to the 
financial and currency crises that have followed financial liberalisation in many 
countries. Proponents, on the other hand, argue that financial openness enhances 
investment and economic growth. 
Theory suggests different channels through which financial integration can 
positively affect investment and growth. Despite the theoretical case for capital 
account liberalisation, attempts at establishing a robust empirical link between 
financial openness and growth have so far not been very successful. However, one 
should be cautious in interpreting the lack of a strong statistical link as evidence 
against liberalisation. As noted earlier, it may be that the measures of capital 
account liberalisation employed in most studies, including this one, do not 
adequately capture complex phenomena like financial liberalisation. Attempts at 
identifying the conditions under which liberalisation might be beneficial have also 
been hampered by the lack of satisfactory measures of financial market 
development and institutional strength. To complement the existing research, we 
examine this issue by using the available data on capital flows instead of the 
measures of capital account liberalisation. Consistent with conventional wisdom, 
we find that foreign direct investment and portfolio inflows enhance growth. By 
contrast, bank inflows appear to have a negative effect on growth, although this 
result is less robust to changes in equation specification than the results for FDI 
and portfolio inflows. Future work should attempt to more closely identify the 
different channels through which capital flows affect growth. 19 
 
Appendix A: Data 
Country List 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, 
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Thailand, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. 
Variable List and Data Sources 
Growth 
First difference of the log of real per capita GDP. 
Source: IMF 
Education 
Average years of secondary education of the population over 15 years of age. 
Source: Barro and Lee (1996) 
Investment 
Gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP. 
Source: World Bank 
Government consumption 
Government consumption expenditure as a share of GDP. 
Source: IMF 
Trade openness 
Sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a share of GDP. 
Source: IMF 
Black market exchange rate premium 
Per cent premium over the official exchange rate. 
Source: World Bank 20 
 
Gross capital inflows 
Sum of foreign direct investment, portfolio inflows and other investment liability 
as a share of GDP. 
Source: IMF 
Foreign direct investment 
Foreign direct investment in the recipient country as a share of GDP. 
Source: IMF 
Portfolio inflows 
Non-resident acquisition of domestic equity and debt securities as a share of GDP. 
Source: IMF 
Bank inflows 
Non-resident acquisition of domestic bank assets as a share of GDP. 
Source: IMF 
Banking sector size 
Total assets of the banking sector as a share of GDP. 
Source: IMF 
Index of law and contract enforcement 
Constructed by International Country Risk Guide. 
Source: Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) 
Index of accounting standards 
Constructed by International Country Risk Guide. 
Source: Beck et al (2000) 
Crisis dummy 
1 if nominal exchange rate depreciation is more than 20 per cent per year. 
Source: IMF 21 
 
US interest rate 
US treasury bill rate. 
Source: IMF 
Terms of trade 
Ratio of export price index to import price index. 
Source: World Bank 22 
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